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We study an overlapping-generations experiment with multiple families in which
redistributional transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to
children. Supporting the old is a purely inter-generational (intra-family) transfer,
whereas grants to children also involve an element of intra-generational (inter-family)
solidarity. Our treatment variable is the tax rate determining the amount of
redistribution by means of the compulsory pension scheme. We investigate to which
degree compulsory solidarity crowds out voluntary solidarity. We also consider
whether voluntary solidarity relies more on grants to children or on support to the old
aged, and the mechanisms which are used in eliciting transfers from family members
from other generations.
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1. Introduction
Voluntary transfers to one’s parents or children are a major factor in the allocation of
individuals’ income and time. Parents invest time, energy and money in raising their
children, and they also provide them with substantial sums of money in the form of
gifts, college tuition and grants. Although the exact figures are contestable, estimates
indicate that as much as 80% of total assets in the U.S. is involved with
intergenerational transfers from parents to adult children (Kotlikoff, 1988), with about
50% of these being inter vivos (Gale and Scholz, 1994). Children, on the other hand,
not only spend time and energy in attention and care of their parents, they also provide
them with old-age support. For example, McGarry and Schoeni (1995) use data from
the Health and Retirement Study to observe that 7.1% of the adult children give
financial transfers to their parents.
The explanation of these voluntary intergenerational transfers is not a well-established
matter. Some explanations rely on altruism that arises from kinship (e.g., Becker,
1974), or on childrens’ feelings of guilt or duty towards their parents having been
instilled in them by their parents because of their concern about their old-age support
(Becker, 1993); others refer to direct or indirect reciprocity and strategic motives (e.g.,
Bernheim et al. 1985, Cigno, 1993, Cox, 1987).
Another issue is the implication of a tax-financed transfer system for voluntary within-
family transfers. If private transfers are motivated by altruism, public transfers are
known to crowd out private transfers $-for-$ because of the Ricardian-equivalence
effect. Moreover, under altruism voluntary transfers are often found to be negatively
related to the recipient’s pre-transfer welfare (see, e.g. McGarry and Schoeni (1995)).
If, on the other hand, financial transfers are motivated by a reciprocity or exchange
motive, government intervention can also be expected to lead to a (typically not $-for-
$) crowding out of transfers from parents to their children. Becker (1993), e.g., notes
that a government program that transfers resources to the elderly will lead parents “to
not (to) try as hard to make children  more loyal or guiltier or otherwise feel as well
disposed towards their parents” (loc.cit. p. 401). As children are no longer expected
(or needed) to help out in old age, parents will invest less in their children. Moreover,
if investing in one’s children aims at increasing their income-generating capacity, the
private return to these investments decreases as soon as future incomes will get taxed,
making these investments less attractive.
The degree to which crowding out occurs is not well established in the literature.
Khnnemund and Rein (1999), e.g., found no support for crowding out. Cigno and
Rosati (1996), on the other hand, found in a different context that an expansion of
social security displaces intra-family solidarity.
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In the present study we examine the crowding-out effect of compulsory (government)
transfers on voluntary intergenerational transfers in an experimental setting. One
advantage of this method in the present context is that in experiments with students as
subjects motives that derive from kinship can be excluded. Hence, to the extent that we
will observe voluntary cross-generational transfers they are likely to derive from reci-
procal and strategic considerations. Another advantage is that experiments by their
very nature give detailed information on individual behavior and make it, moreover,
possible to isolate the effect of a key variable, in this case being the effect of
government intervention on voluntary intra-family transfers.
We implement an experimental design with two families coexisting at the same time in
which every subject has one child and one parent. Intertemporal consumption smooth-
ing cannot be achieved by savings. Instead, the experimental subjects are supplied with
two instruments. One instrument (’support’) involves a purely intra-family intergenera-
tional transfer from child to parent. The other instrument (’grant’) involves a transfer
in the opposite direction, from parent to child. Notice that in our experiment fertility is
taken as exogenous (each parent has one child), so grants should be interpreted as an
investment in the quality of the child. The grant increases the income-earning capacity
of the child. In line with this, grants are added to the wage income children earn when
entering adulthood.1
In the absence of government intervention support is an effective form of redistribution
since at the time of the support the adult child has a wage income and the parent is in
his old-age and has no wage income. Grants, however, cannot be used as a
consumption-smoothing device in this case. Grants might be deployed, nevertheless if
subjects consider these grants as a device to commit the child to supporting the parent
when old. In other words, grants can appeal to direct reciprocity: giving a grant might
induce the descendants to give support in return.
Total adult income (wage plus grants) is taxed on behalf of a compulsory pension of
the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) variety. So, the pension scheme is a collective scheme,
redistributing income from the present young (working) generation to the present old
(retired) generation, involving both families. Therefore, grants also imply an intra-
generational (inter-family) redistribution.
The above framework enables us to investigate our central question, i.e. to what extent
(increasing) government intervention crowds out voluntary intergenerational
intrafamily transfers. The treatment variable in our experiments is the pension tax rate
which can be low or high. Pensions complement voluntary (old-age) support. Hence,
individuals might consider the compulsory pension scheme as an alternative to within-
                                                       
1 More generally, the grant variable can also be interpreted as an individual's investment in the
production possibilities of the next generation. The more is invested, the more the next generation
will be able to provide for pensions to the previous generations.
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family transfers. A comparison of the low and high tax treatment allows us to examine
the extent to which the public pension scheme crowds out voluntary private support,
and/or grants.
In our experimental setting, every time period two families are ‘living’ both consisting
of a young and an old generation. This feature makes the compulsory pension system
(strategically) interesting as it introduces a free rider problem with respect to
investments in children (grants). Because future tax incomes are redistributed via a flat
pension benefit, a positive grant not only increases one’s own pension, but also that of
one’s contemporary in the other family. As a result, subjects might tend to avoid
intrafamily redistribution by relying less on investments in children and more on old-
age support if the tax rate increases. Unlike grants, supports are direct inter-
generational transfers, which do not interfere with the pension system and thus leave
the other family’s welfare untouched. So, basically two opposing forces are at work in
our setting. First, we expect an increase in the PAYG-system to crowd out old-age
support. But, second, we expect such an increase to lead to a redirection of transfers
from children to parents.
It should be noted, though, that the partial crowding out of voluntary transfers does
not necessarily mean that these transfers have become less efficient as a consumption-
smoothing device. The PAYG-system guarantees that some automatic consumption
smoothing will take place. The higher the tax the lower the voluntary transfers that are
required in addition to the public pension in order to accomplish perfect consumption
smoothing. So, if individuals are trying to accomplish consumption smoothing by
voluntary intergenerational transfers, an increase of the size of the public pension
system makes these transfers, both old-age support and investments in children, partly
redundant. But, the net effect of government intervention cum voluntary transfers
might be an increase in generations’ welfare.
Ours is not the first experimental study of overlapping generations. For example,
Cadsby and Frank (1990) study Ricardian equivalence in an overlapping generations
experiment. A paper with a focus similar to the present one is Van der Heijden et al.
(1998). They study the occurrence of cooperative transfers in a finite overlapping
generations game. They employ only one-directional transfers (i.e. from young to old).
They found that subjects are on average willing to give support somewhere halfway
between the non-cooperative and the full efficient level, but tokens of (indirect)
reciprocity were weak at best. However, they do not have the two-family structure,
and they do not consider the effect of government intervention. By allowing for
government intervention we are able to infer whether the willingness to transfer gets
undermined; by allowing for transfers from old to young, we can investigate whether
direct reciprocity plays a role in engendering support to the old.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the
underlying overlapping generations model on which our experimental study relies. The
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benchmark behavior as implied by perfect and efficient consumption smoothing as well
as by pure selfishness is derived. We also discuss our behavioral hypotheses. After
describing the experimental procedure in section 3 the results are presented in section
4. Concluding remarks in  section 5 summarize our major findings and outline possible
extensions.
2. The model structure and main hypothesis
In the overlapping-generations model that forms the basis for our experiments we
allow for two families. Each family consists of a sequence of generations. One
individual represents a generation of a family, and the generations of each family
partially overlap. Individuals live for two periods. In the first period, they receive a
fixed (labor) income of Y, in the second period they receive no fixed labor income.
Instead they receive a flat pension benefit, financed from contributions by the then
young individuals, possibly supplemented by a voluntary transfer from one’s successor.
Payoffs to each individual are equal to the product of the consumption levels in the
first period and the second period of one’s life. Hence, there is a strong incentive to try
and smooth one’s consumption over the two periods. Given the primary income
distribution and the absence of a savings possibility, perfect consumption smoothing
can only be achieved by means of transfers.
In the first period (when young) individuals make two decisions. First, they decide how
much of their income they wish to transfer to their parent who is presently old. This
amount is called the (old-age) support. Second, they decide how much of their income
they wish to invest in their child. This investment is called the grant. Grants raise the
child’s income in the next period and thereby also the mandatory pension tax that is
levied over this income. Tax receipts from the young are distributed equally over the
present old generation. Hence, grants increase one’s child’s income, but they also
increase one’s own pension benefit and the pension benefit of one’s contemporary in
the other family.
To introduce the notation, let index t refer to generations (t = 1,...,T), and let index i
refer to families (i = 1, 2). We then define:
( )0≥itG The grant that generation t  of family i  gives to generation t + 1 of
family i




,  for j = 1 2, The consumption level of generation t  of family i  in j -th phase of
life
ut
i Payoff (or utility) of generation t  of family i
Pt+1 Pension received by (all families of) generation t  when old
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The flow diagram in Figure 1 describes the direction of the flows of transfers in the
experiment. Notice that grants are from old to young, while support and pensions
imply a transfer from young to old. The taxes to be paid by every individual when
young are proportional to exogenous labor income plus the grant received from one’s
predecessor, while every old individual receives a flat pension benefit.  So, the PAYG-
system can lead to redistribution between the two families.
Figure 1
Flows of transfers within and between families
The basic structural relationships are:





i= ⋅1 2, , Intertemporal payoff function of
generation t  of family i
(2) ( )[ ] itititi t GSGYC −−+−= −1,1 1 τ Consumption level of generation t  of
family i  when young




t2 1 1, = ++ + Consumption level of family i  of
generation t   when old
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Here τ  with 0 1< <τ  is the constant marginal tax rate, andY is the (labor) income
one earns while young (the wage income level of the old is set to 0). The other
variables have already been defined above.
Equation (1) indicates that the payoff is equal to the product of the consumption levels
in the two periods of life. As equation (2) shows, consumption when young is what
remains after labor income and grant (from the parent) are taxed and after support (to
the parent) and grant (to the child) are subtracted. Equation (3) indicates that
consumption when old, is equal to the sum of the support received from the next
generation (one’s child) and the collective pension benefit. Equation (4) describes the
PAYG pension. Incomes of both families of generation t+1 including the grants are
taxed and redistributed equally over the two families of the previous generation (who
are now old).
Starting from the above model two benchmark outcomes naturally suggest themselves.
The first is where no voluntary intergenerational linkages exist. If future choices do not
depend on present ones, then generation t of family i has no incentive to support its
parent, so the optimal decision is
(5) S t
i = 0  for i = 1 2,  and t = 1 2, , ... .
Anticipating this, leaves only one reason for a positive grant, namely consumption
smoothing via the pension system. By means of a positive grant itG  generation t  of
family i  increases the income of generation t +1 of family i  when young and thus the
pension Pt+1 , as defined by (4), which generation t  of family i  receives when old. It is
easily verified, however, that this does not justify positive grants and, hence, that every
stationary and symmetric equilibrium implies2
(6) 0=itG  for i = 1 2,  and t = 1 2, , ... .
The intertemporal payoff in this case can be seen to be equal to ut
i =τ(1-τ)Y2.
As an alternative benchmark we look at the most efficient stationary way of
consumption smoothing, that is,
                                                       
2 Result (6) follows from ∂ ut
i /∂ itG <0 which, using (5), is equivalent to




t GG =−1 , the condition simply requires ( ) ( )ττ +<+− 21 itGY  which holds for all grants





t CC ,2,1 =
The intertemporal payoff in this case can be seen to be equal to ut
i =3Y2 which is
larger than the pay-off for the non-cooperative outcome as long as the tax rate is not
equal to 0.5.
Under the condition that S St
i=  and itGG =  for i = 1 2,  and t = 1 2, , ... , perfect
consumption smoothing can be seen to lead to the following condition in terms of G
and S,
(8) ( ) 2/21 YGS ττ −=+ .
According to equation (8) there exists a continuum of ( )GS , -constellations allowing
for efficient stationary consumption smoothing. Thus even if all individuals of all
generations agree on this, they still would face a considerable intergenerational
coordination problem. Notice, moreover, from (8) that for any given value of τ, if
subjects were to rely merely on grants, these would need to take on much larger values
than if they were to rely on supports only. For example, for tax rates less than or equal
to 25% the consumption-smoothing grant would have to be larger than labor income
Y, while consumption-smoothing levels of support will always be less than labor
income.
The treatment variable used in our experimental study is the tax rate for which we
distinguished just two levels, namely
• the low tax rate τ  = 0.05 and
• the high tax rate τ  = 0.25.
Our basic behavioral hypothesis concerns the effect of the level of the public pension
scheme upon the level of private transfers. It is hypothesized that a larger degree of
compulsory transfers, i.e., a larger tax rate, crowds out voluntary transfers. This can be
due to the subjects’ perception of the public pension scheme as a substitute to
voluntary transfers.
Crowding-Out Hypothesis: The higher tax leads to lower levels of  supports S t
i
and grants itG .
In the above hypothesis it is neither specified what will be used more (grants or
support) nor which of the two transfers will be crowded out to a larger extent. As
noted earlier, grants can only be used as a consumption-smoothing device as long as a
positive tax rate is in place. This makes grants a less effective consumption-smoothing
device than support. On the other hand, it should be noted that as grants are taxed and
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used for financing the pension benefit, a grant automatically smooths consumption to
some extent. A positive grant raises one’s child income and thereby future tax revenues
and one’s own old-age pension. So, even though positive grants are not always
individually rational, at least there is always some direct positive feedback (which is
not true for support). So, beforehand it cannot be unambiguously established whether
grants will dominate support, or not. By the same token it cannot be established
whether crowding out will affect grants more than support. Given this indeterminacy,
we prefer to put the issue of grant dominance by means of the following questions,
related to the crowding-out phenomenon:
Related Questions (I) (a): Will grants dominate support, i.e. itG ≥ S t
i ?
(b): Will grants be more susceptible to crowding out
than  support?
Apart from the values of grants ( itG ), support ( S t
i ), and payoffs ( ut
i ), the experimental
results will also be represented by the realized efficiency of redistribution. The standard
efficiency measure (realized payoff / maximal payoff) overstates performance, as
subjects realize a part of the payoff even if grants and supports are zero. More
importantly, this aspect biases a comparison of the efficiency levels in favor of the high
tax treatment, because there the payoff  in case of zero transfers is substantial. In
particular, as noted earlier for values of the tax rate close to 50% optimal consumption
smoothing will almost be realized without any voluntary intergenerational transfer.
Obviously, in the high tax treatment lower voluntary transfer are required anyhow to
get consumption smoothing realized. As we want to measure the efficiency gain which
results from subjects behavior only, we use realized efficiency, Reff, defined as the
increase in the actual payoff over the payoff generated with zero transfers, expressed
as percentage of the maximal increase of payoff. As, again, the theory does not lead us
in formulating hypotheses on the efficiency of voluntary transfers, we formulate this
issue in the form of a question to be answered by the experimental results.
Related Question (II) Will the higher tax rate lead to a higher or lower
efficiency of voluntary transfers?
Notice that up till now we have not said anything on how subjects try to commit their
successors to supporting them during old age. In the results section we will shed light
on this issue by reporting the correlations between grants and support that can be
derived from regression analyses. The idea is that voluntary transfers to the old might
require a behavioral link between the decisions of the different players. One possible
device might be that by giving grants subjects want to elicit support from their
successors. In that case, a positive grant may act to raise one’s own consumption via
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direct reciprocity („I give to you, because you give to me“, Elster, 1989, Gouldner,
1960): by the child ’repaying ’ a grant with (old-age) support.
If intertemporal consumption smoothing came about via support only, on the other
hand, individuals are apparently relying on indirect reciprocity. By giving to his
predecessor a subject might try to engender his successor to do the same to him. For
example, the rule could be to support the parent in the same way as the parent
supported her or his parent. Hence, the rule is to treat someone nicely in return for
how this person has treated someone else (and not in return for how this person has
treated you, Hammond, 1975).
In the context of the present experiment, direct reciprocity could reveal itself through a
positive correlation between S t
i  and itG 1− , that is, a player rewards her parent with a
higher support if the grant from the parent was higher. Indirect reciprocity would
require a positive correlation between S t




In the experiment we have relied on two families (i = 1,2) and sequences of five
generations ( t  = 1, 2, ..., 5). Subjects were informed that there were two families and
a sequence of generations. The number of generations and their place in the sequence
was not revealed to the participants. To play a sequence of rounds with 2 families and
5 generations, we would need only 10 subjects. When conducting the experiment,
however, we actually did run two or three independent sessions at the same time. This
prevented the subjects from inferring the lengths of the queues from the number of
subjects present in the laboratory. 6 sessions were run with tax treatment τ  (60
subjects) and 5 sessions were run with tax treatment τ  (50 subjects), giving us 11
independent observations in total.
The experiment was performed at Tilburg University, The Netherlands, in December
1997 on four different days. An announcement in the university bulletin invited
participants for a decisionmaking experiment that would earn them money. Some
background of the participants (age, subject of study, and gender) is available from the
answers to the post-experimental questionaire (Appendix C). The details of the
experimental procedure are described by the Protocol (Appendix 0) as well as by the
other appendices mentioned there.
                                                       
3We would like to thank Klaus Abbink and Abdolkarim Sadrieh for providing RatImage (Abbink and
Sadrieh, 1995) which we used to implement the experiment software.
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The decision variables of generation t = 1 2, , ...  of family i = 1 2,  are the variables itG
and S t
i , i.e. its grant and its support4. The sum of these two (non-negative) variables
was restricted to be less than or equal to net income, inclusive of received grants. In
addition, each generation ( t = 1 2, , ... ) of each family ( i = 1 2, ) was also asked to specify
its expectations concerning S t
i
+1  as well as Pt+1 . That is, subjects were asked how
much support they expected to receive from their child and how much pension they
expected to receive from the collective scheme. When making decisions and specifying
expectations generation t  of family i  was informed about the following historical
variables: itG 1−  (grant received from parent) 2−tG  (grant parent received from
grandparent), S t
i
−1  (support by parent to grandparent) and C t
i
1 1, − (consumption level of
parent when young).5
In the experiment the fixed gross income when young (Y) was set at 20. Remember
that tax rates in the two treatments were τ  = 0.05 and τ =0.25, respectively. With
grants (G) and support (S) equal to zero this would give a payoff ( ut
i ) of 19 (19×1)
and 75 (15×5) in treatment τ  and τ , respectively. Optimal consumption smoothing,
on the other hand, would secure a payoff of 100 (10×10) in either treatment.
Except for starting (t=0) and stopping (t=6) conditions6, every generation (t = 1, ..., 5)
of every family i  was encountering the same type of situation. We refer to each series
of successive plays by the five generations of both families as a round. To allow for
learning, subjects played 5 or 6 successive rounds. At the beginning of a round,
subjects were randomly (re)assigned to a family and a generation.
The sequence of events for a subject in a round is as follows: (0) waiting screen (1)
screen lights up, giving historical information (see above), and asking for decisions
about support and grant, (2) after decisions are entered, subject is asked to state
expectations regarding support and pension; (3) as soon as the next generation has
made its decisions a screen lights up with support and pension received, and the
corresponding earnings, (4) after confirmation the round ends and the waiting screen
for the next round appears.
                                                       
4 In the experiment we do not use expressions like parent, child, or family but refer to predecessors,
successors, and queue; grant and support are referred to as transfer and gift, respectively.
5 The last three of these variables could be retrieved only after a (registered) mouse click by the
particpant. As a matter of fact we also allowed generation t  of family i  to compute the consumption
level C t
i
2 1, −  of its parent by inserting a value S t
i . From this information about C t
i
2 1, −  a subject could
,in principle, also deduce the previous choice jtG 1−  with j i≠  by means of equations (3) and (4).
6 The relevant choices for the generation before the first one (t=0) and the generation after the last one
(t=6) were predetermined by the experimenters (but not revealed to the subjects). The starting and







We anticipated that the subjects would find the experiment rather complicated.
Therefore, we made sure that the subjects had plenty of time to go through the
instructions, to ask questions, and practice with the time structure of the game and the
relation between decisions and payoffs. In total, sessions lasted between 2½ and 3
hours. About 1½ hour was reserved for instructions, questions and individual practice.
As the post-experimental questionnaire and conversations with subjects indicated, we
were successful in explaining the game to the subjects; 93% stated that the instructions
were clear.
4. Experimental results
In this section we will, first, test our main hypothesis and consider the formulated
related questions. In the second subsection we will shed some light on the dynamics of
the transfers and on the mechanism subjects use in trying to extract transfers.
4.1 Main hypothesis and related questions
According to the crowding-out hypothesis forced redistribution by a system of higher
taxes leads to lower grants and lower supports. This hypothesis is largely supported by
the data. Table 1 presents the average levels of transfers, and the corresponding
payoffs and effciency levels.
Table 1
Average levels of grants G, support S,  realized payoff u, and efficiency  Reff
G S u Reff
τ 3.90 1.53 50.9 39.4%
τ 2.19 1.01 92.8 71.7%
p-values 0.004 0.117 0.004 0.004
We have:
Crowding-out hypothesis:  In comparison with the low tax treatment, the high tax
treatment yields significantly lower levels of grant (G(τ )=2.19 versus G(τ )=3.90;
Mann-Whitney rank test: m=5, n=6, p=0.01). The difference in support between the
two treatments has the expected sign but misses conventional significance levels
(S(τ )=1.01 versus S(τ )=1.53; Mann-Whitney rank test: m=5, n=6, p=0.12).
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The result suggests that support is more immune to government intervention than
grants which must be due to the combined effect of the free-rider problem (a larger
part of the grant is transferred to the other family under the high tax treatment) and the
decreasing importance of grants as a token of direct reciprocity. As support remains
unaffected it becomes relatively less attractive to keep relying on grants. Notice,
moreover, that crowding out is not complete: in the high tax treatment supports and
especially grants are still positive.
Table 1 also answers the questions on grant dominance:
Related questions (I); grant dominance. (a)Players choose grants significantly
higher than supports: G(τ )>S(τ ) as well as G(τ )>S(τ ), (in both treatments the
hypothesis of no difference is rejected at the 5% level; Wilcoxon rank tests using
independent averages per group of 2 families as data points; low tax treatment: n=6
and p=0.03; high tax treatment: n=5 and p=0.04), but (b) the percentage decrease due
to the tax increase is larger for grants than for support, i.e. a 57% and a 33% decrease,
respectively.
In spite of the established grant dominance, for both treatments the actual level of the
grant is far below the consumption-smoothing level while this holds less so for the
actual level of support.7 Obviously, as noted earlier, grants are a very ineffective device
for consumption smoothing, and so, this result once more suggests that a more likely
reason for giving grants would be to commit the successors to giving support in return.
We come back to this point below.
Notice from table 1 that the efficiency of transfers is lower in the low tax treatment
than in the high tax treatment. Efficient consumption smoothing would have led to a
payoff of 100 (per subject per round) in either treatment. The average actual payoff
equals 92.8 in the high tax treatment and it equals 50.9 in the low tax treatment, so
that in the former case 71.7% of the potential gain is realized (i.e. 17.8 out of 25),
while in the latter case the realized gain is only 39.4% (i.e. 31.9 out of 81). The former
efficiency level is significantly larger than the latter level (71.7% versus 39.4%; Mann-
Whitney rank test: m=5, n=6, p=0.01).  So, we have,
Related question (II), efficiency The realized efficiency level is significantly higher in
the high tax treatment than in the low tax treatment.
                                                       
7In the low-tax treatment the consumption-smoothing level of grants (at a given level of tS =1.53)
would have to be equal to 149.40, while for support (at a given level of tG =3.90) , this level would
have to be equal to 8.80. In the high-tax level the corresponding numbers would be 15.96 for grants
and 4.45 for support.
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Thus, although a higher tax leads to crowding out in our experiment, it does not
decrease efficiency.  To the contrary, the larger the collective pension system, the more
consumption smoothing subjects are able to achieve with their voluntary transfers.
4.2 Additional analysis
The foregoing analysis abstracts from the dynamics of the transfers over time. The
actual dynamics are graphically illustrated by Figure 2 which lists the time sequence of
the average support and grant in the natural time order (starting with generations t  =
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 of round 1, then of round 2 etc.).
Figure 2
The dynamics of average support and grants
What emerges from this figure is that in the low tax treatment τ  grants and supports
are relatively stable. In the high tax treatment τ  there is a slight erosion of both
supports and grants. Moreover, over time grants are unambiguously larger in the low
tax treatment than in the high tax treatment while that holds not so for support. In
some rounds supports in the high tax treatment are higher than in the low tax
treatment.
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After subjects had made their decisions for S t
i  and itG  in a round, they were asked to
report their belief itS 1ˆ +  about how much support they expect to receive from their
successor. Subjects appear to be too optimistic about the support to be received. In the
low tax treatment subjects expect to receive itS 1ˆ +  =2.53 while they receive S t
i =1.53
(difference is significant: Wilcoxon rank test: n=6; p=0.03). In the high tax treatment
τ  subjects expect to receive itS 1ˆ +  =1.85 while they receive S t
i =1.01 (difference is
significant: Wilcoxon rank test: n=5; p=0.04). Obviously, these results also imply that
participants give less in support to their parent than what they expect to receive from
their child.
The expected support gives some clue as to the importance of (expected) reciprocity in
the individuals’ transfer behavior. The case of direct reciprocity requires a positive
dependency of St
i  on itG 1− , that is, participants give more support to their predecessors
if these predecessors have given a higher grant to them. Support is a more effective
consumption-smoothing device and so some subjects merely want to rely on them. In
that case giving support to the predecessor might trigger support from the successor.
According to such indirect reciprocity St
i  should depend on St
i
−1, that is, participants
give more support to their predecessors if their predecessors have given more support
to their own predecessors. Similar behavioral dependencies are advanced for the level




tG 1− ). A grant (
i
tG ) may be used to elicit






Table 2 gives OLS regression results, for each treatment separately, on how the
decisions for St
i  and itG  are related to the decisions by the predecessor (St
i
−1
and itG 1− )
8. Since the value for St
i
−1 only appears on a subject’s screen after a
mouseclick, we include only those cases in which the subject actually requested to see
the variable. As an additional explanatory variable we include the expected support,
i
tS 1ˆ + , from the successor in the same family. Grants and supports may also be
motivated by ‘anticipated’ reciprocity, and participants may perhaps attempt to match
the support they expect to receive from their successors.
                                                       
8 We do not wish to put too much emphasis on the results. For one thing, the regressions assume
independence of all observations, which is not satisfied according to the most rigorous standards (only
session aggregates can be assumed to be independent). Also, there may be simultaneity in the
decisions about the S and G, which our simple OLS regressions do not take into account.
Nevertheless, the regressions yield several interesting results which may at least be indicative for the
behavioral regularities in participants’ choices.
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Table 2
Regression results for supports St




τ τ τ τ
Const 0.37  (1.38) 0.37 (2.62)  3.18 (9.62) 1.39 (6.37)
i
tG 1− 0.09  (1.81) 0.03 (0.58) -0.00 (0.00) 0.12 (1.63)
S t
i
−1 0.07  (1.12) 0.18 (3.16) -0.16 (2.11) 0.19 (2.07)
i
tS 1ˆ + 0.36  (7.23) 0.08 (5.49)  0.33 (5.24) 0.00 (0.15)
2
adjR 0.18 0.21 0.10 0.04
 obs. 261 173 261 173
Note: t-values are between parentheses; for St
i
−1 we only considered the cases where the former
decision was actually looked at by mouseclick.
From table 2 we find, first, very little evidence for direct reciprocity. The grant
received ( itG 1− ), appears to have very little impact on the support supplied (St
i ). The
result holds for both tax levels, but is especially clear in the high tax treatment. Hence,
participants do not seem to reward their predecessors with higher support when they
receive a higher grant. So, although grants are generally larger than supports, they
don’t appear to be very effective as a device for eliciting support.
Second, the strongest signs for indirect reciprocity are in the high tax treatment. Here
we find that the support given to the predecessor (St
i ) is positively and significantly
affected by the support given by the predecessor (St
i
−1). For the low tax treatment,
however, we do not find such a relationship. This is in line with our result, established
earlier, that participants concentrate relatively more on supports in the high tax
treatment. To achieve this they rely more on indirect reciprocity.
Finally, the expected support from the successor ( itS 1ˆ + ) appears to have a stronger
impact in the low than in the high tax treatment. For both St
i  and itG , we find higher
and more significant coefficients for expected support in the low than in the high tax
treatment. So, subjects appear to base their transfer decisions on expected instead of
actual direct or indirect reciprocity under the low-tax treatment. In the high-tax
treatment only indirect reciprocity is expected, and subjects behave according to their
expectation although the actual indirect-reciprocity effect is not very strong.
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5. Concluding discussion
In our two-family experiment we have allowed for intergenerational transfers in both
directions, i.e. from parent to child, by so-called grants, and from child to parent, by
so-called (old age) support. Besides, a compulsory transfer system proportionally
taxed income of the adults of both families and transferred the receipts to the old-aged
of both families in a lump-sum fashion. We implemented a high tax treatment and a
low tax treatment. It was hypothesized that a large compulsory tax system would
erode voluntary intergenerational transfers (crowding-out hypothesis).
The experimental data were by and large in line with the crowding-out hypothesis: in
the high tax treatment both lower levels of grants and lower levels of supports were
observed. However, only the difference in grants reached a statistically significant
level. In both tax treatments the levels of grants were significantly higher than the
levels of supports. Moreover, in the high tax treatment subjects were better able to
smooth their income over time. Hence, although the larger collective transfer scheme
does partially crowd out voluntary transfers in our experiment, the net effect on utility
is clearly positive.
The crowding out of transfers was not $-for-$ (as it should be if altruism were the
driving force), which forcefully suggests that private transfers in our experiments were
based on an exchange or reciprocity motive. Given the possibility of two-way transfers
in our experiments, (at least) two forms of reciprocity could motivate private transfers.
One possibility is that individuals provide support conditional on the support provided
by the predecessor. We find some evidence for such indirect reciprocity in the high tax
treatment but not in the low tax treatment.
Another possibility is that individuals provide support conditional on the grant
of their predecessor. We do not find evidence for such direct reciprocity in either tax
treatment. Nevertheless, in the low tax treatment subjects mistakingly tend to lay much
confidence in grants as a mechanism for eliciting support.
From theoretical studies it is well known that a social security system potentially can
distort family choices regarding fertility, savings and intergenerational transfers (See
e.g. Ehrlich and Lui, 1998 for a recent example). Empirical tests in this area are
sometimes based on macroeconomic cross sections of time series data, sometimes on
household surveys. The paper by Cigno and Rosati (1996) is an example of the former
method, while Cigno et al. (1996) provide an example of the latter method.  After
estimating fertility and savings equations based on macroeconomic data for a number
of countries Cigno and Rosati (1996) conclude that an expansion of social security
discourages fertility and raises household savings. Cigno et al. (1996) test whether
within-family transfers are based on altruism or are driven by self-interest.
Corresponding to our results they do not find much evidence for altruism. As their
survey and many other surveys in the field mostly have been collected for other
purposes, it turned out not to be possible to control for all relevant variables.
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Experiments such as ours give by their very nature detailed information on individual
behavior and make it, moreover, possible to isolate the effect of key variables, thus
yielding more insight into the driving forces behind transfer behavior. This paper shows
the potential of experimental methods for the study of social-security systems’ impact
on family-based choices. One key choice has been omitted from our set up: the
decision on the number of children. Obviously, apart from investing less in children,
government intervention might as well incite parents to have fewer children. This is the
basis of the so-called old-age-security hypothesis (see, e.g., Cigno, 1993, for a survey).
The basic assumption is here that children are raised in order to uphold an
intergenerational transfer system that has been agreed upon by some implicit
intergenerational contract. A crowding-out hypothesis would then imply that founding
a social-security system will lead to a break down of the contract, and a decrease of
the fertility rate. In our experiment fertility is taken as exogenous (each parent has one
child). It is not difficult, however, to think of a set up in which a grant is persistent in
the sense of increasing the future size of the dynasty. We leave this extension to future
research.
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Appendix 0: PROTOCOL
1. Invitation by announcement (university news bulletin) and registration at the
secretary's office (background data: see post-experimental questionnaire)
 
2. Subjects were randomly seated at personal computers (visually isolated); received
written instructions (Appendix A) which were read aloud (to generate common
knowledge) taking about 15 minutes; further 10 minutes to study instructions
individually and to ask private questions (of clarification).
 
3. Written instructions for practicing (three pages; available upon request) including
the basic time scheme (dynamic structural relationships) of the model (Figure 1)
were explained and distributed. During practice subjects decides for both families
and all generations with bookkeeping requiring understanding of the dynamic
structure and how payoffs are related to decisions (on average 45 minutes).
 
4. Pre-experimental questionnaire (Appendix B); in case of wrong answers mistakes
were explained (15 minutes)
 
5. Main experiment with 5 or 6 successive rounds for given initial and termination
conditions; subjects did not know in advance the number of trials (they only were
told that there will be several rounds with randomly allocated roles (families and
generations); 10 subjects formed a matching group among which the 10 roles per
play (2 families x 5 generations) were randomly allocated (on average: 90 minutes).
6. Post-experimental questionnaire (Appendix C) and afterwards private payments
(15 minutes)
20
Appendix A: General Instructions
Instructions
Welcome to this experimental study of decision making. During the experiment you can earn money
with the choices you make. The money you earn will be paid to you, privately and in cash, after the
experiment.
We will first go through the instructions together. As you will notice, the instructions are
fairly complicated. Therefore, we will give you a lot of opportunity to ask questions and to practice
with the procedure of the experiment. It is not allowed to talk or communicate during the experiment.
Choices and earnings
The experiment consists of several rounds. In each round two groups will be formed. You will be
assigned to one group. You cannot know which subjects will be in your group. In each group the
subjects will be put in a row. In turn each participant of the group will make two choices. These
choices will be explained below. You will not know which place you will have in the row.
The choices that you make when it is your turn, affect your own earnings. Your choices also
affect the earnings of the participant before you in the row of your group (your predecessor) and the
earnings of the participant after you in the row of your group (your successor). Furthermore, your
choices affect the earnings of the participant in the other group that makes her or his choices at the
same time as you do (your contemporary). Conversely, the choices of your predecessor, your
successor and your contemporary affect your earnings.
The stage in which you make your choices is called the active stage. After the active stage
there is a passive stage. In the passive stage you do not make any choices. During the passive stage
your earnings in the round are determined. In both the active and the passive stage all amounts will
be denoted in points. How you can earn money with these points will be explained below.
You make two choices during the active stage just like every other participant. Firstly, you
decide whether or not you want to make a transfer ["transfer"] to your successor in your group. If
you make a transfer you must also indicate the size of the transfer. It is convenient to remember that
transfers always go forward in time. Secondly, you decide whether or not you want to make a gift
["overdracht"] to your predecessor. If you make a gift you must also indicate the size of the gift.
Gifts always go back in time.
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Your earnings will be determined as follows. At the beginning of the active stage you get a
starting endowment of 20 points. If your predecessor in your group has decided to give you a
transfer, then your starting endowment ["startbezit"] is supplemented with this transfer. Notice that
you are the successor of your predecessor, so you receive the transfer determined by your
predecessor. For example, if your predecessor decides on a transfer of 4 then your starting
endowment is increased with 4 points. The resulting amount will be called your gross endowment
["bruto bezit']. In the example, your gross endowment is 24 points. From your gross endowment you
must pay a contribution ["afdracht"] of 5%. Your contemporary in the other group will also
contribute 5% of her or his gross endowment. This is done to make a general payment to your
predecessor and the predecessor of your contemporary. In the example above you would contribute
5% of 24 points is 1.2 points. If you subtract your contribution from your gross endowment, you get
your net endowment ["netto bezit"]. In the example, this is 2.8 points. Notice that a contribution like
a gift goes back in time.
Then you can make your decisions. Firstly, you can make a transfer to your successor.
Secondly, you can make a gift to your predecessor. The transfer and the gift cannot be negative.
Furthermore, the sum of the two must be smaller than your net endowment; you cannot spend more
than your net endowment in a certain round. If you subtract your transfer and your gift from your
net endowment, you get your end endowment 1. This is the end of your active stage in the round.
Then follows the passive stage. In the passive stage you do not make decisions. In the
passive stage you may receive two amounts. Firstly, it is possible that your successor makes a
transfer to you. Secondly, you as well as your contemporary receive a general payment out of the
contributions by your successor and the successor of your contemporary. This general payment is
determined as follows. The gross endowment of your successor is equal to 20 supplemented with
your transfer. From this endowment your successor contributes 5%. The gross endowment of the
successor of your contemporary is equal to 20 plus the transfer of your contemporary. From this
endowment the successor of your contemporary contributes 5%. The general payment to you as well
as your contemporary is equal to half of the sum of these two contributions.
Suppose for example that during your active stage you decided to make a transfer of 4
points, while your contemporary decided to make a transfer of 2. Then the gross endowment of your
successor is 24 points (20+4),while the gross endowment of the successor of your contemporary is
22 points (20+2). Your successor then contributes 1.2 points (5% of 24) and the successor of your
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contemporary contributes 1.1 points (5% of 22). The sum of these two amounts is 2.3 points. This
amount is divided over you and your contemporary: you as well as your contemporary receive a
general payment of 1.15 points.
If you add the gift from your successor to you and the general payment to you, you get the
end endowment 2. Your earnings in a round in guilders are equal to the product of the two end
endowments in the two stages divided by 10:
earnings = 0.1 * (end endowment 1 * end endowment 2) guilders
Notice that you need to acquire points in both your active and passive stage to earn money.
You do not know which place in the row your group you will have. It cannot be excluded
that you have the first or the last place in the row, though the chance for this is rather small. If you
are the first in the row, then the choices of your predecessor are determined by us. Similarly, if you
are last in the row, then the choices of your successor are determined by us. Notice, furthermore, that
the situation is the same for each participant. Each participant takes the same decisions and for each
participant earnings are determined in a similar way.
Information
During the active stage the computer screen will standard display the transfer from your predecessor
to you. However, if you wish, you can request for more information about your predecessor. Thus
you can ask for the transfer by the predecessor of your predecessor to your predecessor. You can ask
for the gift from your predecessor to her or his predecessor. You can ask for the end endowment 1 of
your predecessor. Finally, if you have entered a value for your gift to your predecessor, you can
request for the  end endowment 2 of your predecessor.
Multiple rounds
Each round you will be newly assigned to one group. Also your place in the row of your group may
be different from the one in the previous round. In each round you will have to wait until all of your
predecessors have made their choices. Then your active stage starts, in which you make your two
choices. Then your passive stage follows, in which the choices of your successors and your
contemporary determines your earnings. After that you will have to wait until all your successors
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have made your choices before a new round starts. Your earnings in the experiment will be equal to
the sum of your earnings in all the rounds.
Schematic summary of the experiment
Active stage
starting endowment = 20
transfer by predecessor to you                                                 =                         +
gross endowment =
contribution (5% of gross endowment)                                   =                         -
net endowment =
transfer from you to sucessor = - (first choice)
gift from you to predecessor                                                    =                         - (second choice)
end endowment 1 =
passive stage
transfer from successor to you =
general payment to you and contemporary
from contributions successors                                                 =                         +
end endowment 2 =
earnings = 0.1 * (end endowment 1 * end endowment 2)  guilders
PS. general payment to you and contemporary from the contributions of successors =
0.5*[0.05*(20+your transfer)+0.05*(20+transfer contemporary)]
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Appendix B: Pre-experimental Questionaire
Before we start practicing the procedure of the experiment, we would like you to indicate which of the
statements below you think are correct or incorrect (circle the appropriate answer). Please raise your
hand as soon as you are finished. One of us will come to your table to check your answers.
1. Your decisions affect your contribution. correct         incorrect
2. Your decisions affect your general payment. correct         incorrect
3. Your transfer to your successor affects the general
payment to your contemporary. correct         incorrect
4. Your transfer to your successor affects the end
endowment 1 of your successor. correct         incorrect
5. Your gift to your predecessor affects the earnings
of your contemporary. correct         incorrect
6. Your gift to your predecessor affects the earnings
of your predecessor. correct         incorrect
7. The transfer of your contemporary to her or his successor
affects your earnings. correct         incorrect
Correct answers:
1 incorrect, 2 correct, 3 correct, 4 correct, 5 incorrect, 6 correct, 7 incorrect
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Appendix C: Post-Experimental Questionaire
At the completion of the experiment the following questionnaire was distributed. Between
brackets [ ] the scaling and corresponding outcomes (percentages or average value, mv) are
indicated.
1. Are the instructions clear in your opinion? [1=yes (93%), 2=no (7%)]
2. Could you indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statement?
"The experiment only becomes clear after some practicing."
[1-7 scale: 1=disagree; 7=agree, av=5.2]
3. Could you indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statement?
"The experiment only becomes clear after some real experimental rounds."
[1-7 scale: 1=disagree; 7=agree, av=4.0]
4. Has the experiment been carried out in accordance with the instructions in your opinion?
[1=yes (97%), 2=no (3%)]
5. Did you receive sufficient, too much or not enough information about the decisions of other
subjects during the experiment? [1=sufficient, (66%), 2=too much (9%), 3=not enough (25%)]
6. Could you indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements? [1-7
scale: 1=disagree; 7=agree.]
"In this experiment you should pay attention to the decisions of your predecessors." [av=4.7]
"Your decision has to depend on what you think that your successor will choose." [av=5.0]
"Your own choice has clear influence on what your successor will choose." [av=4.6]
"You made your decisions mainly on the basis of fairness considerations." [av=3.9]
"Other subjects in the experiment made their decisions mainly on the basis of fairness
considerations." [av=2.9]
"You made your decisions mainly on the basis of considerations about what is good for your
own earnings." [av=5.9]
"Other subjects in the experiment made their decisions mainly on the basis of considerations
about what is good for their own earnings." [av=6.1]
7. Could you indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements about
your decisions on gifts?  [1-7 scale: 1=disagree; 7=agree]
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"If your predecessor made a gift to her or his predecessor, then it is beneficial for your own
earnings to make a gift to your own predecessor." [av=3.3]
"If your predecessor made a gift to her or his predecessor, then it is fair to make a gift to your
own predecessor." [av=4.9]
"If your predecessor made a transfer to you, then it is beneficial for your own earnings to make
a gift to your predecessor." [av=3.3]
"If your predecessor made a transfer to you, then it is fair to make a gift to your predecessor."
[av=5.0]
"It is in every case the best thing to make a gift to your predecessor, independent of what
previous subjects do". [av=3.1]
8. Could you indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements about
your decisions on transfers? [1-7 scale: 1=disagree; 7=agree]
"If your predecessor made a transfer to you, then it is beneficial for your own earnings to make
a transfer to your successor." [av=4.5]
"If your predecessor made a transfer to you, then it is fair to make a transfer to your
successor." [av=4.1]
"It is in every case the best thing to make a transfer to your successor, independent of what
previous subjects do". [av=4.6]
9. What would your recommendation be (about how to play the game) for fututre subjects of
similar experiments?
10. Do you have suggestions to improve the experiment? If yes, please elaborate on them
below.
Finally, we would like to know a few things about you.
* You sex is are [1=male (61%); 2=female (24%), missing (15%)]
* What do you study [1=economics or related, (72%) 2=other (11%), missing (17%)]
* Did you participate in any earlier experiments? [1=yes (69%); 2=no (16%), missing (16%)].
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